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December of 2008 marks the 30th year of the beginning of China’s economic ope-
ning. The country’s rapid development since 1978 is without historical precedent. 
Yet this growth is even more impressive when one surveys the entire period from 
the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949 to present. Although the years from 
1949 to 1978 were close to catastrophic, and the basis for economic development 
over the next thirty years could have hardly been worse, on the 60th anniversary of 
the government’s founding, the country’s achievements—at least from an economic 
perspective—must be viewed as an extraordinary success.
On the 30th anniversary of China’s economic opening, the following article assesses 
that which has been achieved to date. It also explores the causes of the economic 
stagnation of the “lost decades” between 1949 and 1978. The deep stagnation 
experienced during the early years of the People’s Republic as well as China’s reo-
rientation in 1978 and subsequent boom can only be understood with reference 
to this historical period. Any assessment of the country’s present-day political and 
economic situation is also contingent upon an appreciation of the long cycles that 
characterize Chinese history. 
Since the opening of the country and its rise to the world’s second-largest economy 
and trading partner, China has surpassed Japan and taken on equal standing with 
the EU as the most significant decision maker in economic and political affairs after 
the US. China’s importance is not yet reflected in World Bank and IMF quotas or in 
the composition of the G8—yet China is sure to take on an increasingly prominent 
role in coming years.
If China can maintain the growth rates witnessed over the past three decades, in 
less than 15 years it will surpass the US as the world’s largest economy and most 
significant trading partner. While the future is by no means preordained, all of the 
preconditions for this to occur are in place. China still possesses large labor reserves; 
is a net creditor to the rest of the world and holds currency reserves of a historically 
unprecedented volume; will soon be the largest and most dynamic domestic market 
in the world (and will therefore continue to attract direct foreign investment); and 
displays considerable potential for growth in domestic demand. Furthermore, the re-
form of China’s financial sector and the deregulation of capital flows could potentially 
stoke additional economic expansion. The current financial crisis has not left China A Great Leap Forward, the Second Time Around
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unscathed, but is unlikely to have a lasting effect on 
the country’s long-term development.
Prior to the rise of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912), 
China was a highly developed country, and much 
more advanced than Europe in the applied sciences 
and arts. At the beginning of the 19th century, for 
example, China’s share of world GDP was consi-
derably larger than Britain’s. A number of factors 
were responsible for China’s economic torpor in 
the 17th and 18th centuries and its rapid decline 
in the 20th. 
The Qing—unloved rulers from Manchuria—were 
primarily concerned with maintaining military po-
wer. They relied on China’s time-tested institutions, 
but did not develop its administrative structures 
further. Until the end of the Qing Empire, it was 
impossible to awake a readiness for modernization 
and change within the administrative apparatus. The 
19th-century Chinese experience stands in sharp 
contrast to Japan, which embarked on a radical path 
of modernization in the Meiji Restoration. In the 
period from 1700 to 1850, the population of China 
grew from 150 to 410 million. However, during this 
time period the size of the Imperial administration 
remained unchanged. As a result, the government 
was increasingly incapable of managing its admi-
nistrative tasks. The impoverishment of the rural 
population and the increasing weakness of govern-
mental authority led to a wave of uprisings, the 
largest of which was the Taiping Rebellion, which 
lasted from 1850 to 1864. Approximately 20 to 50 
million people died during this tumultuous period, 
causing China’s population to drop to 350 million 
by 1873. 
Beginning with the First Opium War (1839–1841), 
the Western powers—particularly Great Britain—
took advantage of China’s evident weakness. The 
British purchased tea in Canton, but were unable to 
sell their industrial goods in China due to a lack of 
demand. To resolve this problem, the British sold 
industrial goods in India, “created” demand for opi-
um in China, and supplied this demand with opium 
from India, thus creating a circle of commercial 
exchange. In 1841 Hong Kong was “acquired,” and 
efforts were made to establish additional bases for 
Far East trade. Following the Anglo-French Invasion 
of 1856–60, China seceded numerous port cities to 
the British, granted administrative autonomy and 
exemption from taxation, and later the right to ad-
minister and collect tariffs. Following its defeat in 
the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), China recognized 
the independence of Korea and seceded Taiwan to 
the Japanese. In 1900 anti-Western sentiments in 
China led to the so-called Boxer Rebellion. Nu-
merous Western powers were involved in quelling 
the unrest; among them, the German Reich. 
China’s economic modernization was forestalled 
by numerous factors at the beginning of the 20th 
century. Investment in automated tools and ma-
chines was largely redundant, for example, due to 
a vast surplus of human labor. China’s ruling class 
was unable to recognize the advantages of Western-
style development. In their view, China, the “Middle 
Empire,” was the center of the world—intellectually 
and spiritually superior to the West and dominant in 
terms of both its size and population. Social unrest 
and international conflict also weakened China fur-
ther: All prospects for stable economic development 
were undermined by rebellions and revolts—which 
culminated in a civil war that lasted over twenty 
years—and Japan’s military expansionism starting 
in 1931.
1949–1978: The Agony of the Mao Years
In the wake of the stagnation which lasted from the 
17th to the 19th century, and two wars in the first 
half of the 20th century (the Chinese Civil War and 
Japanese invasion), the Communist regime that took 
power in 1949 was confronted by a country in ruin—
even worn-torn Germany in 1945 had significantly 
better prospects for future economic development. 
In China, for example, there were no factories that 
could be rebuilt, no trade relations that could be 
reestablished, no universities, and no experience 
with industrial manufacturing. An inexperienced 
ruling class without academic training or practical 
experience in civil administration stood at the helm 
of a country with a largely illiterate population. The 
retreat of the Nationalists to Taiwan and migration 
of many entrepreneurs to Hong Kong left a vacu-
um that was exacerbated by the purge of many of 
the country’s remaining elites. In 1950 average life 
expectancy in China was 36 years.
The development of an administrative apparatus 
was the first item on the new government’s agenda. 
Agriculture was nationalized, and farm workers 
were initially paid based on output. A few year 
later wages were introduced. While two-thirds of 
the industrial sector was in state hands under the 
Nationalists, the Communists quickly placed all of 
Chinese industry under government control. Small 
businesses remained in private hands. The goal of 
becoming as independent as possible from foreign 
powers necessitated the development of heavy in-
dustry. Under Stalin, industrialization in Russia was 
enabled through the restriction of private consump-
tion and the siphoning off of agricultural surpluses. 
This strategy was only viable in China on a limited A Great Leap Forward, the Second Time Around
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basis. The production of consumer goods was in-
deed of secondary importance—as was the material 
prosperity of the population—yet the agricultural 
sector, in which 90% of the population was emplo-
yed, could not be fully harnessed to boost industrial 
production.
The Soviet Union sent over 10,000 specialists to 
assist in the industrialization effort, and 28,000 Chi-
nese were trained by the Russians prior to the Sino-
Soviet split in 1960. Russian financial assistance, by 
contrast, was meager: Only 4% of China’s industrial 
investment was financed through Soviet loans (no 
grants were provided!) Zero assistance, of course, 
was received from Western countries.
Nevertheless, by 1958 the Communist government 
could boast a series of successes. The hyperinfla-
tion caused by the war was quickly brought under 
control with wage payments that were coupled to 
a basket of goods consisting of staple foods and 
other basic commodities. Average annual growth 
was 8.9% during the First Five-Year Plan (1953–57). 
The population grew from 560 million in 1952 to 
630 million in 1957, and per capita income rose ap-
proximately 5% on an annual basis. The population 
jump was attributable in no small part to increased 
life expectancy, which rose rapidly to 57 years by 
1958. The Communist Party of China (CPC) also 
encouraged a high birth rate. Serious doubts have 
been raised about official data from this period. Yet 
it is undisputed that the standard of living in China 
rose considerably in the years up to 1958. 
In 1956 the Hundred Flowers Campaign was initi-
ated. Intellectuals were encouraged to criticize the 
bloated bureaucracy and its methods, but within 
limits. An “intellectual” was anyone who had gradu-
ated from a secondary school. Under this definition, 
there were some 5 million intellectuals in China in 
1956 (of a population of 630 million). 
The Hundred Flowers Campaign was directed at a 
fundamental problem suffered by all socialist sy-
stems: Party functionaries didn’t always have the 
necessary training or experience, were often not 
motivated, worked for their own pecuniary interests, 
and failed to fulfill official targets. Due to the ex-
cessive expansion of the administrative apparatus 
and power strivings of top officials, Mao feared that 
the weaknesses endemic to the old, imperial power 
structure would be reproduced. The intellectuals 
were initially reluctant to voice criticism, but as 
criticism appeared within the CPC in 1957, the in-
tellectuals began to take an open stance. After five 
weeks the entire campaign was stopped and replaced 
by an Anti-Rightest Movement, aimed at intellec-
tuals. Between 400,000 and 700,000 “intellectuals 
with rightward leanings” were “displaced.” 
Mao’s next initiative was the Great Leap Forward 
(1956–60). This time Mao tested his abilities as 
an economic expert. Mao had recognized that the 
Stalinist model couldn’t function in China. Instead 
of siphoning off agricultural wealth for the benefit 
of industry and drawing the rural population into 
cities, Mao concluded it would be better to boost ag-
ricultural and industrial production in rural regions, 
which had a surplus of labor and ongoing problems 
with underemployment. To achieve this—so Mao’s 
rationale—one didn’t need to make large invest-
ments. One simply needed to fire the revolutionary 
passions of the rural population and exhort them to 
heroic acts of selflessness. With so much unused 
manpower, dams could be built, canals dredged, land 
re-cultivated, and iron forged, or so Mao’s thinking. 
His ideas were not entirely new and remind one of 
the mass effort involved in the construction of the 
Great Wall of China. 
30 Million Die of Starvation in the Great 
Leap Forward
In 1958 the Chinese harvest was a good one. In 
1959, by contrast, the harvest was catastrophic. Poor 
weather was partially to blame. While the peasants 
were busy winning the revolution in the trenches, 
the fields were neglected. Large swaths of China 
began to suffer from famine. Over 30 million Chi-
nese starved or fell victim to disease. This was not 
reflected in official statistics, however. Agricultural 
production, in fact, was said to have doubled. Even 
industrial production fell during this period. 
Mao suffered a considerable loss of prestige. Bitter 
conflict broke out in the Central Committee, which 
soon led to the formation of two opposing factions. 
Mao was the leader of a romantic mobilization of 
the rural population. Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, 
by contrast, represented the principle of individual 
responsibility. In 1960, as discordant relations with 
the Soviet Union intensified, Khrushchev suddenly 
withdrew all Russian advisors from China. 
Mao won the power struggle against the pragmatists 
in his party with the launch of the Great Proletari-
an Cultural Revolution. In the narrowest sense the 
Cultural Revolution lasted from the end of 1965 
to April of 1969. A more expansive interpretation, 
however, sees the revolution continuing to 1976. It 
occurred in four phases and was aimed at elimina-
ting “revisionism” and creating new revolutionary 
structures.A Great Leap Forward, the Second Time Around
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In the first phase, which lasted until the summer 
of 1966, Mao won the upper-hand in the Central 
Committee and successfully pursued his campaign 
to expunge “revisionism.” In the second phase, 
which lasted until the end of 1966, the Red Guards 
were established. The Red Guards, a mass move-
ment that primarily drew its membership from the 
adolescent population, were tasked with abolishing 
the so-called “Four Olds”: Old Customs, Culture, 
Habits, and Ideas. In the third phase, which lasted 
from January 1967 to mid-1968, the Red Guards 
seized power. With this seizure of power, the dispute 
between the radicals and conservatives broke out, 
the revolutionary momentum crumbled, and there 
was no clear answer to the question: what should 
one do with power? In mid-1968 Mao called on the 
People’s Army and demobilized the Red Guards. 
In the fourth phase, which lasted from mid-1968 
to April 1969, Mao re-organized the party and the 
military gained in influence. Although the Cultural 
Revolution was officially over, the largest excesses 
took place after 1969 in military purges. 
One can assume that the official statistics—particu-
larly between 1966 and 1976—were manipulated. 
It’s unknown how many Chinese lost their lives in 
this period. The estimated death toll ranges from a 
few million to 30 million people. Nevertheless, the 
population is estimated to have increased by 170 
million during this period. The constant unrest dealt 
a severe blow to the economy, particularly in the first 
three years of the Cultural Revolution. Elites and 
other “intellectuals,” such as party functionaries, 
teachers, and researchers, were interned in labor 
camps or killed. Most schools and universities were 
closed. According to official statistics, inflation-
adjusted GDP rose by more than 100% from 1966 
to 1978, while per capita income increased by more 
than 70%. A Chinese economic miracle!
1978–2008: Forced March to Prosperity
China was bitterly poor in 1978, as the first eco-
nomic reforms were introduced: inflation-adjusted 
per capita income was US$250, and the population 
stood at just over one billion. By 2007 the popula-
tion had increased to more than 1.3 billion, and per 
capita income to US$5,330—a twenty-fold increase 
in less than 30 years. 
The Cultural Revolution, which persisted for almost 
ten years, led to the closing of numerous secon-
dary schools and universities. This damage to the 
educational system, alongside the persecution of 
the “intellectuals,” left deep scars in the quality 
of China’s leadership class. The new leaders un-
der Deng Xiaoping recognized that a fundamental 
change of course was imperative. This change of 
course was called “Opening” and “Motivation.” The 
opening of the country to foreign investment and 
international trade ended the development strategy 
of autarky that had previously been pursued. In 1978 
the total value of exports and imports was approxi-
mately US$6 billion. The second half of Deng’s new 
strategy—“Motivation”—was aimed at the rural 
Box 1
Chronology of Reform
1978  Start of the Open Door policy for foreign trade 
and investment
1979  Transfer of agricultural collectives to private 
households; township and village enterprises 
(TVEs) receive enhanced status
1980  Creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
1984  Private companies permitted (with fewer than 
eight employees)
1986  State enterprises can now go bankrupt
1988  TVEs begin to wane in importance
1990  Opening of the first stock exchange in    
Shenzhen
1993  Political decision made to create a “socialist mar-
ket economy” 
1994  Creation of corporate law; abolition of multiple 
exchange rates
1995  Employee relationship for workers in state enter-
prises
1996  Full convertibility for the current account 
1997  Restructuring of state enterprises   
Return of Hong Kong and Macau to the People’s 
Republic of China
1999  Private ownership provided for under the Chinese 
constitution
2001  China  becomes  member  of  the 
World Trade Organization (WTO)   
In the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–2005) the 
reduction of environmental impacts is identified 
as a goal for the very first time
2003  Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement signed 
between the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region and the People’s Republic
2004  Ownership rights provided for under the consti-
tutionA Great Leap Forward, the Second Time Around
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population. The agricultural collectives were pro-
gressively abolished, and their holdings transferred 
to the rural population, which was encouraged to 
take on more “personal responsibility.” Following 
the fulfillment of production quotas, which were 
purchased by the government at an intervention 
price, surpluses could now be sold by farmers on 
the free market. The intervention prices—initially 
far below market value—were gradually adjusted 
to prevailing market prices. Quotas were also re-
duced, and finally abolished in the 1990s. Land 
could not be sold, but it could be leased for long 
periods (15 to 30 years). The Chinese government 
is currently preparing to reform agricultural-land 
ownership rights. 
The Chinese have always been pragmatists who 
don’t think much of theory. As a consequence, they 
tend not to develop their own theories. They develo-
ped gunpowder, the printing press, navigational in-
struments, dam construction, and irrigation systems 
before the Europeans. Yet prior to the opening of 
the country, the Chinese had not developed a single 
pioneering theorem in mathematics or physics. In 
this way, no new theory of economic development 
has been devised or adopted by the Chinese. “We 
must cross the river by feeling the stones with our 
feet,” Deng said with regard to China’s program 
for reform. A new approach would be tested in a 
province, and continued if successful. If the case of 
failure, the approach would be stopped. The costs 
of preserving the status quo thus become visible 
for the participants, as do the risks, costs of change, 
and profits. After the zigzag course taken during the 
Mao years, this new direction seemed appropriate, 
even if long-term success was beyond the immedi-
ate horizon. Without knowing it, Deng’s approach 
was in complete alignment with the findings of the 
modern school of behavioral economics.
With a second principle—embodied in Deng’s state-
ment that “it doesn’t matter what color a cat is, as 
long as it catches mice”—the role of ideology was 
devalued. In 1987 a three-step development strategy 
was initiated: The first step was to double the GDP 
from 1980 in ten years (this goal was reached ahead 
of schedule). The second step, to quadruple GDP by 
the end of the century, was also attained early. The 
third step was to increase per capita income to the 
level of a middle-income country by 2050. In the 
view of CPC, once this was achieved, modernization 
would be complete.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the question was 
posed in Eastern Europe as to whether reform should 
be undertaken gradually, or whether it would be 
better to radically restructure all enterprises and 
institutions in one fell swoop. This question was 
never posed in China. In contrast to Eastern Europe, 
reforms in China were introduced from within—the 
political structure was never a subject of debate. 
Consequently, China could not serve as an empiri-
cal demonstration of the advantages of a strategy 
of progressive reform which could be adopted by 
Eastern European countries—the challenges they 
faced emerged in a fundamentally different context. 
Indeed, if anything, China is a poor example for pro-
gressive restructuring. Numerous factors distorted 
market mechanisms and resource allocation while 
also contributing to corruption in the first twenty 
years of reform: the incongruence between prices 
set by the market and government, the competition 
between state enterprises and private firms, and the 
rationing of inputs provided by state enterprises. 
Today, however, government intervention in the 
economy is much less pronounced: 85–95% of all 
transactions take place under free-market condi-
tions.
The program for reform initiated by Deng was 
not always implemented smoothly. The CPC was 
not unified in its commitment; reformers regular-
ly struggled against conservative elements within 
the party. The decisive test between opposing fac-
tions was carried out in Tiananmen Square. Direct 
confrontation is traditionally avoided in Chinese 
culture. Linguistically, references are made to hi-
storical or literary metaphors. In the case of actual 
conflict, one typically sends representatives or pro-
xies to advance one’s interests. Tiananmen Square 
was a conflict between the radicals, who used the 
students as proxies, and the conservatives, who re-
lied on elite units of the military. Over the short 
term, the conservatives were victorious, and were 
able to slow the tempo of political reform that had 
been induced by economic development. Over the 
long term, however, the reformers have been able 
to maintain control both economically and poli-
tically. As cynical as it may sound in light of the 
many thousands who perished: Tiananmen Square 
was an act of shadowboxing. A direct confrontation 
between the impoverished interior provinces—from 
which the conservatives drew their support—and the 
wealthier, reform-oriented coastal regions would not 
have been a desirable alternative. 
Agriculture: More Productive than the US 
The reform of the Chinese economy began in the ag-
ricultural sector. In 1978 some 330 million Chinese 
were employed in the agricultural sector, and only 
100 million in other areas (25 million in state enter-
prises; 15 million in industrial TVEs; 6.5 million in 
construction; 9 million in the transportation sector; 
and 18 million in trade, restaurants, and banking). A Great Leap Forward, the Second Time Around
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The growth in agricultural production triggered by 
reform was rapid and continuous. From 1980 on-
ward the production of high-quality foodstuffs grew 
for the first time. In 2007 some 300 million Chine-
se were still employed in agriculture, contributing 
some 13% to GDP. The degree of productivity that 
has been obtained is considerable: China, for exam-
ple, possesses 25% less arable land than the US, yet 
its agricultural output is 30% higher. Then as now, 
the rural population was largely underemployed, yet 
further migration to the cities was undesired. For this 
reason, municipal governments were encouraged 
to establish small township and village enterprises 
(TVEs). These enterprises were quickly and unex-
pectedly successful. Their success, however, led to 
undesired secondary effects such as increased cor-
ruption, and they quickly reached the limits of their 
productive potential. Political support also dwindled 
from 1988 onward with increasing privatization. 
Industrial enterprises in China are primarily located 
in metropolitan areas on the coasts. The Chinese go-
vernment has augmented the natural advantages of 
the coastal regions (a large population; lower trans-
portation costs; higher education) with the creation 
of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Approximately 
10% of all Chinese industrial production is based in 
Shanghai, and approximately 60% of all industrial 
production is located on the coast. The four richest 
regions are located on the Pearl River Delta (Guang-
dong), at the mouth of the Yangtse (Shanghai), on 
the Bohai Gulf, and in the Peking-Tianjin-Liaoning 
region. The creation of the SEZs is responsible for 
an additional problem: a widening gap between the 
coastal and inland regions. To date rapid growth has 
been primarily focused in coastal regions, which has 
resulted in rising tensions between the populations 
of the wealthier coastal cities and poorer inland 
areas (see box 2).
Box 2
China’s Economy Today
The industrial sector, which is composed of some 8 million 
companies, accounts for 42% of China’s GDP (in Germa-
ny, this figure is xx%). Of China’s working population of 
approximately 800 million people, 22.5% are emplo-
yed in industry. 15% of industrial output is produced 
by state-owned enterprises, and an additional 25% by 
state-controlled holding companies. Government ow-
nership, currently on a sharp decline, is highest in the 
following sectors (according to value added): Tobacco 
(98.6%), oil and gas drilling (93.8%), water (86.7%), coal 
mining (81.4%), oil refinement (77.3%), metal industry 
(46 to 64%, depending on the source), transportation 
vehicles (63%). 
About 10% of global industrial production takes place 
in China, and the country is the world’s largest manufac-
turer of steel in the world (420 million tons were produced 
in 2006). China is also the world’s largest producer of 
coal, which supplies 70% of domestic energy demand. 
Coal deposits are located in northern China. Southern 
China, for its part, is home to the world’s largest dam, 
which was constructed for a cost of US$24 billion. China 
is the third-largest energy producer in the world after 
the US and Russia and the second-largest consumer of 
energy after the US. 
China’s service sector (the seventh largest in the world) 
is less developed than the industrial sector, comprising 
some 40% of GDP. Tourism, which contributes more than 
5% to GDP and is a rapidly growing market, is increasingly 
in line with international standards. China has the second-
highest number of Internet users after the US, and 34% 
of the population has a cellular phone. China is making 
extensive efforts to promote the growth of the natural 
and social sciences. Top students are educated in the US 
and, after returning home, can draw on the international 
contacts they’ve established. 2.8 million scientists and 
academics are active at more than 5,000 government 
research centers, 3,400 university research institutions, 
and 14,000 economic research centers. China’s biotech-
nology and computer sciences are considered first rate, 
and have the chance of playing a leading role worldwide. 
The country also takes great pride in its space program. 
A manned satellite was launched in October of 2005. 
In nuclear research, as well, China has closed the gap 
separating it from Western powers. 
The total sum of exports and imports rose from an insi-
gnificant amount in 1978 to US$325 billion in 1997 and 
to US$1.8 trillion in 2006. China is a member of the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and was accepted 
into the World Trade Organization in 2001, after almost 
15 years of negotiations. The most important outlets for 
China’s exports in 2007 were: the US (21%), European 
Union (18%), Hong Kong (17%), Japan (12.5%), and ASE-
AN countries (7%). 80% of China’s exports are industrial 
goods (machines, electronics, textiles). Crude oil and 
other raw materials are China’s main imports. The key 
importers to China are Japan (17%), the European Union 
(12.5%), ASEAN countries (11%), South Korea (11%), and 
the US (8%). The proportion of high-tech goods exported 
by China rose from 15% in 1998 to 30% in 2007.A Great Leap Forward, the Second Time Around
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From Socialism to Capitalism with Chinese 
Characteristics
Deng pursued a four-tiered growth strategy: Foreign 
trade, foreign direct investment, an extremely high 
savings rate (for a high rate of domestic investment), 
and a restrictive budget policy. The danger of deve-
loping high budget and current-account deficits (a 
so-called “twin deficit,” a classic problem faced by 
developing countries) has thus been avoided, and the 
growth process has been able to proceed unimpeded. 
A more detailed exploration of the four key elements 
of China’s economic strategy is undertaken here. 
Foreign Trade: The Economic Crisis Forces a 
Demand Shift
Foreign trade has been the primary driver of China’s 
growth to date. A striking fact is that China’s leader-
ship has focused on an export-driven growth strate-
gy instead of pure import substitution. This strategy 
is based on a recognition that initial weakness will 
be supplanted by later strength. The export strategy 
is geared at perfecting production and achieving pe-
netration of global markets, in order to subsequently 
supply growing domestic demand with world-class 
products, yet with a home-field advantage. 
China’s strategy of export-driven growth has flooded 
the world with low-cost products, which has stabi-
lized prices in recipient countries. However, this 
growth strategy, which requires enormous inputs of 
energy and raw materials, has increased commodity 
prices worldwide and worsened the terms of trade 
for advanced nations (as well as China). 
Due to the rigid pegging of the Yuan to the US dollar, 
China was also one driving force behind the liquidity 
glut of recent years. Although China is at the core 
of the global imbalances that have developed over 
this decade, it has continually resisted US pressure 
to allow the Yuan to appreciate or to encourage its 
own domestic consumption, either of which would 
help to address distortions in global trade and capital 
flows. While the Yuan has gained more than 15% in 
value against the US dollar since May of 2005, the 
real effective exchange rate in 2008 was congruent 
to that in 2000. The potential for appreciation in real 
terms thus remains large. 
China’s  current  account  surplus  in  2007  was 
US$370 billion, or 11% of GDP (at market prices); 
it exported 40% of GDP (at market prices), or 18% 
of PPP-adjusted GDP. The relative degree of Chi-
nese dependence on foreign demand has become a 
key question in light of the current recession in the 
world’s advanced economies. As exports are mea-
sured in terms of market prices, but GDP in terms of 
value added, one must take into account the extent 
to which exports contain inputs which have been 
imported. According to estimates produced by UBS 
in 2008, the value added by exports represents 45% 
of export revenues. Consequently, China’s degree of 
dependence on exports (in relation to PPP adjusted 
GDP) is closer to 10% than 40%. Together, the US 
and European Union are the destination for appro-
ximately 1/3 of Chinese exports. Were the degree of 
penetration of Chinese exports to remain the same 
(which is a realistic assumption on account of the 
price flexibility of Chinese companies), a 1% fall in 
GDP growth in the US and European Union would 
only lead to a 0.1% fall in Chinese GDP. 
This doesn’t mean that the current crisis will lea-
ve China untouched. It will most certainly restrict 
China’s freedom of action while necessitating a 
shift in the sources of demand for Chinese goods. 
If the Chinese are successful in rapidly realigning 
demand from export markets to the domestic eco-
nomy (as currently foreseen by the government’s 
economic stimulus program), and if foreign direct 
investment does not dry up, the crisis should have 
a relatively moderate impact on Chinese growth, 
which is, incidentally, currently bolstered by low 
commodity prices. 
Foreign Direct Investment: Few Limitations 
Remain 
Modern technologies, modern management me-
thods, and an understanding of the global market-
place have all been essential to the development of 
China’s export economy. Foreign direct investors 
are attracted to China primarily because of the la-
tent growth potential of the world’s most populous 
domestic market. At the beginning of the 1980s 
China preferred foreign investments that helped to 
develop their export economy. In order to ensure 
knowledge transfer, investors were required to sign 
joint venture partnerships with Chinese firms. Tax 
advantages were also offered on a staggered scale, 
depending on the priority of the sector. 
Existing limitations to foreign investment were 
largely abolished at the beginning of the 1990s; 
the precipitous drop in direct investments follow-
ing the Tiananmen Square massacre was certainly 
one factor in this development. Foreigners could 
now produce for China’s domestic market outside 
of joint ventures with Chinese firms, and retained 
their tax advantages. China quickly became a net 
creditor to the rest of the world. As of 2008, China 
has amassed currency reserves of over US$2 tril-
lion. China’s interest in foreign direct investment 
remains strong, however, in order to continue the 
acquisition of foreign knowledge. In 2006 foreign A Great Leap Forward, the Second Time Around
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direct investment made up 14% of GDP and China’s 
direct investment abroad was equal to 3.5% of GDP. 
The sum of China’s current account surplus and net 
direct investment equals more than 20% of GDP. 
China thus has sufficient reserves for its own fo-
reign investment and to endure setbacks. China is 
increasingly becoming an important direct investor 
to the rest of the world. Its investment is aimed at 
securing raw materials and access to foreign mar-
kets, particularly in developing economies. 
Savings and Investment: The Highest Savings 
Rate Ever Measured  
Since 1990 the national savings rate has exceeded 
40% of GDP and even reached 50% in 2007. A 
sustained savings rate of this magnitude has never 
been witnessed in another country in the history of 
economics, and it provides China with a share of 
GDP for domestic investment that even Stalin was 
unable to achieve using the most heavy-handed in-
terventionist policies. While more than 90% of the 
national savings rate in 1979 was attributable to 
the government and private sector, the savings rate 
for private households has continually grown, and, 
at last measure, constituted almost 25% of GDP 
(German households, by contrast, have a savings 
rate of 11%). 
This extremely high savings rate is the result of 
structural anomalies in the Chinese economy and so-
cial system. In the first instance, Chinese households 
must shoulder nearly the full burden of providing 
for retirement, health care, and the education of their 
children. The government assists by providing full 
tax exemption for education or retirement savings 
that are invested in bank accounts or government 
securities. The modern, urban family in China has 
on average three members. The goal of reducing 
population growth was achieved with China’s one-
child policy. The current fertility rate is 1.8, down 
from 6 in 1970. China’s modern households are 
thus able to retain a higher portion of their incomes, 
but are compelled to save more for retirement or 
emergencies. 
An additional reason for the high savings rate is con-
nected to the financing of the educational system. 
Primary and secondary school education is free in 
Germany and many other countries; in Communist 
China, by contrast, fees are widespread, and univer-
sity tuitions are comparable to the annual salary of 
a skilled laborer. Many Chinese families thus begin 
saving for educational expenses as soon as a child 
is born. The average German household devotes 
one-quarter of its income to retirement funds and 
health insurance (when employer contributions are 
factored in). This is roughly equivalent to 12% of 
GDP. If these contributions were saved by househol-
ds instead of being paid into government funds, 
Germany would have a private savings rate of ap-
proximately 23%, just below China’s. 
The second structural anomaly is related to the 
underdevelopment of China’s banking system, a 
system which does not readily provide for the finan-
cing of consumption, education, or the purchase of 
real estate. Families must save for many years before 
purchasing a car or home. Traditionally, bank depo-
sits, government debt, and stocks have been the only 
financial instruments available to households for 
the investment of their savings. The fixed-interest 
return on these investments is below market rates 
for institutional investors, and for years has meant 
an interest rate that is considerably negative in real 
terms. Large areas of China’s interior are undersup-
plied with financial services. Stuffing bank notes 
under the mattress is literally the only option for 
many Chinese savers. If families have a particular 
savings goal, then low interest rates alone force a 
higher savings rate. If Chinese families were able to 
finance just 50% of their real-estate purchases with 
mortgage loans, the savings rate could sink 3–4%. 
The contribution made by businesses to the national 
savings rate has fallen considerably. The exorbitant 
profits earned by Chinese companies in the past 
have evaporated due to intense competition in the 
domestic market—the result of deregulation and the 
opening of China to foreign business—in conjunc-
tion with a continuous reduction in privileges for 
companies closely affiliated with the government. 
That being said, Chinese companies still earn hand-
some profits, which are sufficient to finance the 
greater portion of their rapid expansion. Small- and 
mid-sized companies have little access to outside fi-
nancing, particularly long-term loans, and are forced 
to finance their expenses with non-disbursed profits. 
Previously the government also contributed to the 
high national savings rate. The Chinese government 
has for the most part been running budget surpluses 
since 1992 (there is no data prior to this year). A 
comparison with Germany yields a margin of dif-
ference between 2 and 5% (i.e., Chinese surpluses 
weighed against German deficits). 
Table1
Value Added by Sector. 2007
Figures in percent
Industry Construction Services Agriculture
USA 11.7 4.1 68.5 1.2
EU 19.7 6.6 51.6 1.7
China 42.0 5.5 40.0 12.5
India 22.0 6.8 51.0 20.5
Source: Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. . DIW Berlin 2008A Great Leap Forward, the Second Time Around
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How Long Will China’s High Savings Rate Be 
Sustained? 
Viewed in terms of the goal of optimizing prosperity, 
China’s savings rate is too high. Its financial system 
is also extremely inefficient. China’s high current 
account surpluses are the result of a savings rate that 
exceeds domestic-investment requirements. A red-
uction in the savings rate would help to bring China 
onto a more optimal development path. China’s 
savings rate would fall considerably if, through 
deregulation and opening of the market to foreign 
banks, its financial system more closely resembled 
that of advanced Western countries. 
China’s population is currently aging more rapidly 
than Germany’s. The average senior expends ac-
cumulated savings. Consequently, a lengthening 
of China’s age structure will automatically reduce 
the savings rate. In addition, efforts are currently 
underway to establish a national retirement system. 
This would reduce the need to save for retirement. 
The largest problem involves gathering data on the 
rural population—which still comprises 50% of the 
overall population—for inclusion in such a system. 
China aims to at first limit the safety net of a reti-
rement system to the industrial and service sectors. 
This will further exacerbate the divide between ur-
ban and rural population. 
China’s high investment rate of more than 40% of 
GDP is reflective of a rapidly growing country with 
high demand for expensive infrastructure, modern 
residential development and commercial real estate. 
In 2007 China spent more than US$169 billion on 
transportation infrastructure alone. 22% of all in-
vestment is made in infrastructure; 20% in residenti-
al construction; 15% in commercial real estate; and 
32% in equipment investments. The remaining 11% 
is invested in agriculture and rural infrastructure. In 
light of high business revenues and low levels of 
debt, it’s difficult to appraise this investment rate 
as too high.1
Public Sector Share of GDP Lower than the US 
The division between the private and public sector in 
China is blurry, as the government exercises wide-
reaching authority through state-owned enterprises, 
holding companies with a majority government sta-
ke, and town and village enterprises (TVEs). The 
distribution of total government expenditures and 
revenues between the central government and pro-
vincial/municipal governments has changed fun-
damentally since the beginning of the economic 
reforms. While the central government disbursed 
1  A study by the World Bank came to the conclusion that the wage ratio 
in industrial production fell from 24% in 1998 to 17% in 2005. At the 
same time, production output also grew rapidly.
47% of expenditures and collected 15.5% of reve-
nues in 1978, by 2006 its share of revenues had risen 
to 53%, with revenues falling to 25%. The goal of 
significantly strengthening the central government 
has thus been attained. China’s budget discipline 
is impressive. Surpluses are achieved more often 
than deficits. Moreover, in recent years none of 
China’s deficits would have breached the limits 
under Europe’s Maastricht Treaty. 
The government invests its budget surpluses in in-
frastructure on a massive scale. More money was 
invested in infrastructure between 2000 and 2005 
than in the preceding 50 years. At the end of 2007 
China had approximately 33,000 miles of freeways 
(all toll roads), and 49,000 miles of railway lines. 
Despite high revenues and investment, the natio-
nal budget (without investments) represents less 
than 20% of GDP, placing it below the US. China’s 
pattern of expenditure more closely resembles the 
US than the social market economies of Europe. In 
this way, the unprejudiced observer is persuaded 
to characterize China’s economic system as funda-
mentally capitalist in nature. Expenditure on social 
programs is extremely modest and only comprises 
some 3% of GDP; expenditures on culture, science, 
health care, and education account for an additional 
4.5% of GDP. 
China’s Growth since 1979: Growth 
Factors, Increased Social Services, 
Sustainability 
China’s four-tiered growth strategy—the strengthe-
ning of exports; the attraction of foreign direct in-
vestment; the encouragement of higher savings 
rates; and the reduction of the public spending 
ratio—must be judged in terms of its success. Sin-
ce 1979 China’s economy has grown an average of 
10% annually. After a 12% growth rate from 1979 
to 1988, GDP growth leveled off to 9% between 
Table 2
Chinese Government Expenditures, 2006
In Yuan billions
Investment  439
Innovation, science, & technology  189
Industry, transportation, trade  58
Agriculture  216
Culture, science, health care, education  743




GDP  16 000
Source: Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. DIW Berlin 2008A Great Leap Forward, the Second Time Around
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1988 and 2003, only to increase again to almost 
10% since 2003—annually. This blistering pace 
of growth has not yet slowed. With the aid of a 
production function, growth can be subdivided into 
the production factors of labor and capital, with a 
remaining element, the so-called Solow residual, 
which is generally interpreted as an improvement 
in production technology. China’s labor reserves 
have been mobilized, but not exhausted. Labor only 
contributed 1.5 percentage points in the first phase 
and, more recently, less than 0.3 percentage points 
to GDP growth. Per capita capital stocks have ri-
sen by 7.5% annually and have made the largest 
contribution to growth: approximately 5 percen-
tage points. The Solow residual was constant at 
5.6 percentage points in the first phase, and was 
2.8 percentage points at most recent measure. Since 
1978 the Solow residual has contributed 3.7% to 
GDP on average. The Solow residual itself is com-
posed of three elements: a sectoral shift to industries 
with higher productivity; education; and multifactor 
productivity. (In the standard production function 
a one-sector economy with a homogeneous labor 
force of invariable skill level 
 is used for the sake of simplification.) A shift to 
higher-productivity sectors contributed more than 
2 percentage points to GDP early on, yet made only 
a marginal contribution at last measure, as China’s 
economic structure is being shaped to an ever greater 
extent by market conditions. A redeployment of the 
labor force from agriculture to the industrial and 
service sectors and the lesser importance of state-
owned enterprises have been the hallmarks of this 
shift. Education has made a steady contribution of 
approximately 1 percentage point. The contributi-
on made by multifactor productivity has oscillated 
between 1 and 3.5 percentage points. 
After such a long period of high growth, the questi-
on arises: how wealthy is China? In 2007 GDP at 
market prices was US$3,238 billion, or US$2,500 
per capita. Average values, however, mask China’s 
extremely uneven income distribution. 300 million 
Chinese have no access to drinking water, yet, after 
the US, China has the largest number of billionaires. 
It bears mentioning, however, that the Gini coef-
ficient has fallen continuously over the course of 
China’s development, meaning that inequality has 
also fallen. 
In order to compare China’s wealth international-
ly, a purchasing-power-parity (PPP) adjustment is 
necessary, as very low wages lead to considerably 
lower prices for comparable non-tradable goods. An 
OECD study came to the conclusion that the purcha-
sing power factor for China is extremely difficult 
to measure, but would produce at present at least 
a doubling of GDP at market prices. This correc-
tion will diminish in size with increasing growth in 
China’s standard of living and wage convergence. 
In 1975 the PPP multiplier was 12. 
In this way, China had a PPP-adjusted per capi-
ta income of US$5,325 in 2007, or about 16% of 
Germany’s (US$35,000). China’s PPP-adjusted 
GDP is US$7.034 trillion (Germany: US$2.81 tril-
lion). The Chinese PPP-adjusted GDP is thus appro-
ximately 2.5 that of Germany, half that of the US, 
and the second largest in the world. China will soon 
surpass Germany as the world’s leading exporter. 
China already has the world’s largest currency re-
serves, the world’s largest banks, and is a forerunner 
in numerous branches of the economy. 
If China can continue to maintain an average growth 
rate 6 percentage points higher than the US, China 
will overtake the US as the world’s largest econo-
my in 15 years at the very latest, with a per capita 
income roughly one-third that of the US. But can 
China maintain 8 to 10% growth for another ten 
years, particularly in light of the growth decelera-
tion experienced by other developing countries in 
the past? 
Chinese Age Structure a Key Problem
With regard to its future prospects for growth, China 
possesses a number of trump cards and is also con-
fronted by three central problems. The first problem 
is China’s age structure, which requires a higher 
retirement age and the setting aside of provisions 
for old age. The second problem is the uneven deve-
lopment between the inland and coastal provinces. 
Large infrastructure investments are already plan-
ned in order to enable growth in China’s interior. 
Enormous assistive measures (already passed by 
the government) are necessary in this regard. From 
2006 to 2010 some 180,000 miles of roads will be 
built, increasing China’s road network by 50%. By 
2015 China also plans to expand its railway network 
by 60%, and construct 97 new airports by 2020. 
China’s cities will also have to be developed further 
to absorb the annual migration of 10 to 20 million 
people to urban areas. 
The third problem is connected to China’s ener-
gy-intensive economic structure and the attendant 
costs to the environment. Although Chinese life 
expectancy is comparable to that of Western coun-
tries, its energy-intensive growth has been taking 
a considerable toll on the environment. According 
to a World Health Organization report published in 
1998, of the world’s ten most polluted cities, seven 
are in China. The government had to take extreme A Great Leap Forward, the Second Time Around
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measures in order to satisfy conditions for the 2008 
Olympic Games. Nevertheless, in the Tenth Five-
Year Plan (2001–2005) the goal of reducing envi-
ronmental impacts was stated for the very first time, 
and in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan the Chinese aim 
to reduce energy consumption by 20% by 2010. 
Yet China’s extremely high energy consumption and 
the pollution it creates are not only a result of rapid 
growth. A diverse range of energy subsidies and the 
Chinese tolerance for pollution are two additional 
factors. China has developed a comparative advan-
tage in the production of CO2-intensive goods, and 
has a global market share for such goods of 31%. 
Yet progress has been made. At the beginning of 
December the Chinese government voted to abolish 
subsidies for gasoline and diesel fuel. Consumer 
prices have increased by a factor of ten (!) due to 
the exploitation of the currently low international 
fuel costs. 
An additional circumstance that provides grounds 
for optimism is that a solution to the aforementioned 
problems requires financial reserves, and China is 
well off in this regard. As China’s population was 
uniformly poor, a social security net and environ-
mental consciousness were of low importance. 
Growing wealth has automatically enhanced the 
importance attached to these two issues, and the Chi-
nese government has already undertaken a change 
of course. An effort to counteract the heterogeneous 
development of the coastal and inland regions is also 
becoming apparent. The current financial crisis, for 
example, has stimulated a greater focus on investing 
in China’s interior regions. 
China’s trump cards for future growth are its labor 
reserves and low wage costs; the potential for re-
forming its inefficient state-owned enterprises; its 
enormous financial reserves; as well as the potential 
for reforming its financial market—which would 
fulfill the precondition for the deregulation of ex-
ternal capital flows. 
China’s Labor Market: Immense Potential 
for Development 
Any evaluation of China’s potential for future 
growth should not overlook its labor market. High 
growth always reaches its limits when full-emplo-
yment is achieved and wages climb to international 
levels. With a workforce of 800 million, China has a 
labor-force participation rate of approximately 60% 
(Germany’s is less than 50%). A considerable work-
force potential is offered by the agricultural sector, 
in which 300 million are still employed, yet are for 
the most part underemployed—up to 200 million 
laborers could be redeployed from this sector over 
the mid-term. 
While labor costs, particularly for skilled emplo-
yees, have risen considerably, wages for unqualified 
laborers are still just one-tenth of that in Germany. In 
the industrial sector, unit labor costs are 50% that of 
the US and under 40% that of Europe. Consequently, 
with a view to China’s labor market, there is still 
a great deal of flexibility for a steady contribution 
to growth. 
In the future the public sector will also continue to 
make an important contribution to economic ex-
pansion. Approximately half of all employment and 
value added in the industrial sector is attributable to 
state-owned enterprises, companies with a majority 
stake controlled by the government, and TVEs. In 
1998 this figure was 70%. Profitability is one of the 
areas that has been improved considerably in recent 
years, yet on the whole there are many resource-
intensive problem areas. Productivity in the non-
private sector is considerably lower on average. If 
the trend witnessed in recent years continues, it will 
be possible to obtain further productivity increases 
in government-controlled and -owned enterprises. 
Banking Sector Still Waiting for the Great 
Leap Forward 
China’s partially privatized banking sector, which 
is still controlled by the government and protected 
from competition by capital controls, also evinces 
potential for a great leap forward in productivity. 
Most of the Chinese economy’s problems and ano-
malies are connected to its underdeveloped financial 
market. At present the inflation rate is nearly 10%, 
yet long-term government securities have a yield of 
3%, or a real interest rate of -7%. Debtors are thus 
able to obtain easy money at the expense of savers. 
On the whole, government intervention in the finan-
cial market and the negative real interest rate lead 
to the distorted allocation of resources. 
Outlook
Over the last 30 years China has undergone a radical 
process of modernization, producing a rapid rise 
in per capita income. The extreme gap separating 
China from the world’s highly industrialized econo-
mies and its policy of gradual opening and mod-
ernization have made this record growth possible. 
Foreign investors have recognized China’s growth 
potential and have made massive investments in its 
economy, which will soon be the world’s largest 
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China has sufficient reserves to keep growth high: Labor reserves, financial re-
serves, latent potential for reform and an interior that is still to be developed. Even 
worldwide recession will not decisively slow China’s efforts to catch up with the 
world’s leading industrialized economies. With Asian wealth growing rapidly and 
efforts to create an East-Asian free trade zone, China will be influenced to an ever-
decreasing extent by the Western world and has already become the epicenter of the 
most economically dynamic region in the world. China’s extremely high current 
account surpluses have also lost their economic justification. China should realign 
its economy to encourage a long-overdue increase in consumption and make the 
necessary infrastructure investments to develop its interior provinces. Both of these 
moves would be in China’s own interest. 
Capital controls have previously served the country well and helped to insulate 
China from the Asian crisis. The time is now ripe, however, to open up and deregu-
late its financial market. This would rationalize resource allocation while boosting 
consumption. 
When China—soon to be the world’s largest exporter—allows full currency convert-
ibility, the Yuan will quickly achieve the status of a reserve currency. In this context 
the present “one land, two systems” arrangement with Hong Kong will only remain 
a transitory solution. With full convertibility China’s transition will be complete and 
Hong Kong will be accepted as a center of trade and finance with a special political 
status in a Yuan-based currency union. China—well on its way to becoming the 
world’s largest economy, with the three large financial centers of Shanghai, Shenzen, 
and Hong Kong—will become the steward of the world’s third reserve currency, 
alongside the US dollar and euro. China’s weight in international organizations such 
as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund will also increase considerably 
in the near future. China, which remains a net recipient of direct investment due to 
the attractiveness of its market, has already begun to increase its own foreign direct 
investment. China is already the world’s No. 1 net financial investor. China is not 
only treading a path to prosperity, but to superpower status, as well. 